The Taliban regime in Afghanistan’s decision to recall Afghan Ambassador Farid Mamundzay and appoint the current Trade Counsellor Qadir Shah as the Charge D’ Affaires (Acting Ambassador) in his place has posed a tough decision for the government’s policy on the situation in Afghanistan and its engagement with the Taliban.
The tussle between the two became public on Sunday, after Afghan media outlets published a letter from Afghans based in India accusing the existing Ambassador and other officials of corruption.
In a response Mr. Mamundzay, who has been the Ambassador in India since 2020 and is presently in Delhi, issued a letter calling the allegations “one-sided, biased and untruthful”, and blaming the “collapse of the democratic system” in Afghanistan for the “extreme problems” that Afghans outside their countries face.
However, trouble has been brewing within the Embassy over the past month, after the Taliban Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)’s Human Resources Director issued a letter (Order No. 3578 dated April 25, 2023), recalling Ambassador Farid Mamundzay and asking him to report to the MFA in Kabul.
Another order on the same date by Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said that Trade Counsellor Qadir Shah would “supervise affairs at the Afghanistan Embassy in Delhi, India” and report to the government in Kabul. The move appeared to mirror what the Taliban did in China in April 2022, when the serving Ambassador resigned after the Taliban appointed another senior diplomat serving in the Embassy in Beijing.
When contacted, Mr. Shah said he was not affiliated to any “political party, group or movement”. He said he believed that in its communication the MoFA in Kabul had wished to appoint an officer to resolve issues of “complaints against Embassy officials of corruption and non-performance of their official duties”. He reiterated that he was a diplomat assigned by the pre-Taliban “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” and an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan.
The MEA has thus far declined to comment on the Taliban decision, with officials maintaining that they had not so far received formal notice of the change, and indicating that this is an “internal” matter for the Embassy.
However, bigger apprehensions are over how New Delhi would react if a Taliban-approved dispensation at the Afghan Embassy in Delhi were to act against Afghans in India who are under threat from the Taliban regime in Kabul, or were to raise the Taliban flag at the Embassy, as they have Afghan Embassies in Moscow and in Beijing. Embassies in Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Iran also now have Taliban-approved diplomats at the helm, while many of Afghanistan’s erstwhile 60-odd embassies are facing a closure as Ambassadors have refused to pledge loyalty to Taliban and are running out of funds.
While India, like all other countries does not recognize the Taliban government, the government decided in a major U-turn last year to set up a “technical mission” in Kabul. MEA officials have also travelled to Kabul and met with Taliban ministers, and Taliban officials have been trained in online courses in MEA projects, but in India, the MEA continues to deal with Ambassador Mamundzay for consular and trade issues.
However, accepting the Taliban’s desire to change the Afghan Ambassador would be seen as one step further towards formalizing its ties with the insurgent group that India has accused in the past of carrying out terror attacks, including the 2008 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul in which an Indian diplomat and two ITBP security force personnel were killed.