At its Overseas Ministers Assembly in July 2012, the Affiliation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) did not situation a joint assertion for the primary time within the bloc’s 45-year historical past. The failure was blamed on the actions of the bloc’s chair, Cambodia, which moved to dam delicate criticisms of China’s aggression within the South China Sea. Phnom Penh’s intervention subsequently tarnished the Kingdom’s worldwide picture, prompting some to name for Cambodia’s expulsion from the Southeast Asian bloc.
Ten years later, as Cambodia gears as much as assume a difficult chairmanship subsequent yr, recollections of the 2012 mishap stay vivid. ASEAN’s agenda for 2022 is prone to embody a spread of vital points, together with post-COVID-19 financial system restoration and local weather change. Different much less main objects may embody Timor-Leste’s ASEAN member software and the UK’s request to turn into a full dialogue companion of ASEAN.
However for now, most consideration shall be on how Cambodia leads ASEAN in resolving the political disaster in Myanmar, and offers with negotiations with China on a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea.
The present ASEAN chair, Brunei, has been roundly criticized for legitimizing Myanmar’s army junta by permitting Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the chief of the army authorities, to the bloc’s particular Leaders Assembly in Jakarta on April 24, and enterprise a further go to final week.
In the meantime, ASEAN members have proven contrasting positions concerning the Myanmar disaster. Whereas Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia have decried using power in opposition to unarmed civilians, others sit on the fence or keep silent. The necessity to resolve the problem would turn into extra pressing but additionally extra advanced if a nationwide civil conflict had been to interrupt out within the nation, which is believable as tensions between ethnic armies and the Tatmadaw has escalated.
With no finish to the nation’s troubles in sight, Cambodia will face the equally advanced query of bridge the differing views of ASEAN’s members on the disaster, and implement the “5-Level Consensus” agreed on the Jakarta assembly.
Given its actions in 2012, the long-awaited negotiations on a COC for the South China Sea is also a scorching potato for Cambodia because it assumes the ASEAN chairmanship. In 2019, China and ASEAN agreed to finalize the COC, with Chinese language Premier Li Keqiang setting a 2021 deadline which is prone to be missed, largely because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Erywan Pehin Yusof, Brunei’s second minister of international affairs, has introduced that the COC discussions can’t proceed with no bodily assembly. Furthermore, regardless of holding a number of rounds of talks, China and Southeast Asian claimants stay far aside on key points, notably Vietnam’s name for the COC to incorporate reference to the United Nations Conference on the Legislation of the Sea, a requirement that China doesn’t fancy.
Given the nice and cozy state of Cambodia-China ties, nevertheless, Beijing may push for remaining negotiations on the COC to be accomplished whereas Phnom Penh occupies the chair, slightly than ready till 2023, when Indonesia takes over the position.
Certainly, China’s actions within the South China Sea have significantly expanded since Cambodia final chaired ASEAN, prompting some ASEAN claimants to hunt exterior assist to discourage China’s aggression. This has additional sophisticated the problem, which has now advanced past disputes amongst claimants and turn into the topic of superpower competitors. Moreover, any critical incidents within the South China Sea throughout Cambodia’s ASEAN chairmanship can be prone to freeze COC discussions.
One other situation that’s prone to come onto Cambodia’s agenda throughout its chairmanship is the U.Okay.’s request to turn into an ASEAN dialogue companion. Given the U.Okay.’s financial and political significance for ASEAN, the choice ought to pose few challenges. Nonetheless, ASEAN’s final full dialogue endorsement came about greater than twenty years in the past. Kavi Chongkittavorn warned that lifting a moratorium may “open Pandora’s Field with unknown penalties.” Particularly, for Cambodia, approving the U.Okay. as a dialogue companion throughout its chairmanship may darken its ties with Pakistan, which has been searching for an identical endorsement as dialogue companion since 1992.
If the above points all pose formidable challenges for Cambodia’s ASEAN chairmanship, in addition they seem to current the nation’s authorities with a possibility. Main developments –both a conclusion of the COC or materialization of any a part of ASEAN’s five-point consensus on Myanmar – may very well be a milestone for ASEAN and assist restore Cambodia’s international picture after the occasions of 2012.
There aren’t any blueprints telling how Cambodia ought to chair ASEAN. However the next ideas may assist the nation set up a basis to construct on. First, Cambodia ought to reformulate and stick with a international coverage that mixes firmness and suppleness. The nation must be firmer in defending its independence however extra versatile in searching for a modus vivendi with ASEAN members and superpowers.
Second, approaching tough and controversial points, Cambodia may wish to preserve a low profile and go together with the group. For instance, concerning the COC, conferences with ASEAN non-claimants of the South China Sea to debate and discover frequent factors of curiosity can be helpful preparation for Cambodia’s resumption of the chair. In 2016, for instance, Cambodia was once more singled out for blocking point out of the ruling of the Everlasting Courtroom of Arbitration from an ASEAN assertion, although a number of nations had been in opposition to together with the ruling within the assertion.
Third, Cambodia may additionally take a look at different current ASEAN chairs’ expertise, most not too long ago, as an illustration, how Brunei issued a assertion on ASEAN’s behalf to spotlight the Myanmar disaster, but with out jeopardizing the bloc’s non-interference precept. That features how Brunei addressed the criticisms which were leveled in opposition to it for partaking straight with Myanmar’s army junta.
Fourth, Cambodia may cautiously discover potentialities of working extra proactively with the superpowers. Throughout her go to to Cambodia final week, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman advised Prime Minister Hun Sen that america intends “to work with Cambodia in its position as 2022 ASEAN Chair and assist guarantee it might probably play a constructive position in addressing essential regional political and safety challenges.”
That may very well be the chance for Cambodia to discover what sort of assist the U.S. may supply. Whether or not or not this helps Cambodia resolve any ASEAN situation, the prospect of working with the U.S. may assist leap begin Cambodia-U.S. cooperation, which might support Cambodia’s plan to diversify its international coverage.
The identical goes for China. Chinese language President Xi Jinping has described the ties between Phnom Penh and Beijing as “unbreakable.” Maybe it’s time to validate that, and maybe, too, a time for China to return Cambodia a favor after the 2012 ASEAN Overseas Ministers’ Assembly. We all know how a lot affect China has in Myanmar.
Lastly, if Cambodia had been to face an identical situation to 2012, it ought to no less than attempt arduous to mitigate the results. One possibility is to work with the media to make sure that Cambodia’s place is satisfactorily represented.
Overcoming the above points sounds formidable for Cambodia. It has restricted tender and arduous energy and due to this fact has to depend on diplomatic strategies, which is likely to be insufficient to the intense challenges at hand. Nonetheless, by not attempting, Cambodia would miss a possibility to make the very best use of its ASEAN chair alternative, and to make up for its actions a decade in the past.